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1 Introduction
In job matching markets with costly search quasi-rents arise as soon as agents are matched.
Typically, it is impossible to write ex ante contracts on the division of such quasi-rents from
future matches, and wages are negotiated ex post, i.e. after agents have been matched.’
In the job matching literature, it is usually assumed that a matched worker and firm
divide the value of the match according to an axiomatic Nash (1950) bargaining solution.
It is well known that the resulting wage depends critically on the exact specification of the
Nash bargaining problem, in particular the choice of the so called threat points (Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986).
The seminal papers on matching and search use the particular Nash bargaining solu-
tion in which the threat points correspond to the outside options available to each agent,
i.e. to be unmatched and searching for alternative partners.2  This solution exogenously
fixes the share of each agent in the quasi-rent, i.e. the expected search costs (and fore-
gone earnings) incurred by both agents to form a match, and can thus be described as
‘intertemporal surplus sharing’ (133).  Unfortunately, ISS is by no means the only Nash
solution that can be applied. A frequently encountered alternative allocates fixed shares
in the ‘instantaneous surplus’ to each agent. This instantaneous surplus is the marginal
flow product of labor net of the instantaneous values of leisure to both agents, and is
unrelated to the expected search costs. This implies that the corresponding wages, unlike
ISS wages, do not vary with aggregate labor market conditions, for given productivity
and values of leisure. Thus, we do not only have a variety of a priori equally attractive
Nash solutions to wage setting, but these solutions also have different theoretical and em-
pirical implications. This explains the efforts that are made in the literature to support
axiomatic Nash solutions as equilibria of strategic bargaining games.3  In particular, the
strategic approach provides insights in the strategic role of outside options and disagree-
ment payoffs, and can therefore guide the specification of the threat points in the Nash
solution.
ISS is usually defended as the unique subgame  perfect equilibrium (SPE) of a strate-
1 Ex ante contracts are inconsistent with search frictions (Mortensen, 1982). An alternative to ex post
bargaining arises if agents on one side of the market are committed to wages that are posted ex ante.
Such unilateral ex ante wage setting would take us from the class of models we consider in this paper to
the wage posting models studied by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Mortensen (1990). Of related
interest is the work on competitive search by Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996),  who effectively allow firms
to precommit  to and announce wages and workers to search non-randomly for jobs with specific wages.
2See Diamond and Maskin  (1979),  Diamond (1982),  Mortensen (1982),  Pissarides (1984, 1985 and
1990). Note that ISS is also arguably the most popular solution in the more recent literature (e.g.,
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
3This  is known as the ‘Nash program’, and can be traced back to Nash (1953).
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gic sequential bargaining game along the lines of Rubinstein (1982) that is fully driven
by the risk of breakdown (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). In the context of a
search-matching model, this requires the rate of breakdown of bargaining matches to
grow infinitely large. This cannot be caused by the arrival of shocks destroying the pro-
ductive capacity of the match, as this would imply that producing matches break down
infinitely fast as well. Then, all gains from trade vanish and the model would be trivial.
Thus, it is an extreme, and therefore hard to defend, feature of the bargaining environ-
ment itself. Furthermore, for any positive interval between two bargaining rounds, the
bargaining game with extreme risk of breakdown is an ultimatum game. Such a game
predicts the existence of two extreme wages, each allocating the entire surplus to either
one of the agents, with ISS only holding in expectation. This creates strong incentives
for search on the job, which is usually assumed away in search-matching models with
homogeneous agents.
In this paper we show that ISS can be supported without relying on extreme differences
between bargaining and producing matches. In particular, we show that ISS arises in
the unique SPE of a bargaining game in which agents can precommit to search during
disagreement. This result is derived independently of the risk of breakdown during the
bargaining game, and therefore does not suffer from the critique above. Also, it can be
contrasted with earlier research on bargaining with endogenous search, which shows that
ISS does not arise without commitment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the search and matching
model. Section 3 defines the bargaining problem in a partial framework in which market
opportunities are taken to be exogenous. Section 4 discusses bargaining solutions with ex-
ogenous search during disagreement. We use these results to sketch the arguments usually
applied to defend various axiomatic solutions in the job matching literature. Section 5
then argues that the standard ISS solution arises if we allow agents to precommit to search
in the disagreement state, which is the main result of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
2 The search and matching model
Our model is a standard homogeneous job matching model with endogenous search inten-
sities along the lines of Pissarides (1990). Point of departure is a continuous time world
with two distinct homogeneous masses of infinitely small agents, workers (ZU) and firms
(f). Both workers and firms are risk neutral and maximize payoffs, which are discounted
at a rate p. Workers are endowed with a constant stream of an indivisible unit of leisure.
Leisure is indivisible in the sense that, at each point in time, current leisure can either
be fully consummated or fully traded with firms, after which we will call it labor. Firms
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are entities that can flexibly employ capital. However, capital is only productive if it is
matched to labor. We assume that firms cannot buy more than one unit of labor, or
employ more than one worker, simultaneously. A matched firm-worker pair can produce
a flow of output 7r.  We will refer to producing agents as ‘employed’, and attach the la-
bel ‘unemployed’ to agents that are not producing, firms and workers alike. We will see
shortly that the latter category does not only include unmatched agents, but also matched
and bargaining agents.
Trade of labor takes place in the labor market and is characterized by a trade fric-
tion: matches with agents of the opposite type are only realized after a time-consuming
and costly random process of bilateral search. Following the literature, we assume that
production is a fully specialized activity: agents can only participate in the matching
process if they are unemployed.4 All unemployed agents of each type face the same search
technology. An agent of type i who chooses a search effort si > 0 meets agents of the
other type at a rate si, and incurs search costs I, i = w, f.5 The cost functions are
twice differentiable, and satisfy ~(0) = 0, c/,(O) = 0, 4(s)  > 0 for s > 0, <(oo)  = 00, and
c:(s)  > 0 for s 2 0, i = w, f.6 Unemployed agents do not only incur search costs, but
also receive a flow of ‘leisure’ payoffs ci. Thus, an unemployed agent of type i exerting
search effort s has flow payoffs [i  - G(S).  We assume that 7r > cu,  + [f, so that there are
wages at which agents of both types strictly prefer trade over unemployment.
Because of the trade friction, each match is to some extent a specific relationship,
which generates a quasi-rent that has to be divided among the worker and the firm. We
assume that, right after being matched, the agents enter a bargaining game in which they
negotiate a flow of compensation payments, or wages, the firm has to pay the worker
for providing labor. In particular, compensation is arranged by a contract specifying a
constant wage flow from the firm to the worker, and which cannot be renegotiated.’ In
4See for instance Pissarides (1990). Alternatively one could assume that agents face ‘full bargaining
frictions’, in the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1984),  and cannot bargain with a new partner and work on
the old job at the same time. Together, these two assumptions ensure that workers will not search on-the-
job, even if it is possible. Abbring (1998) explores the incentives for on-the-job search in a homogeneous
matching model with full bargaining frictions, but in which agents can ‘bargain on-the-job’.
51n  a fully developed matching model, we would specify the contact rates as siqi,  for some qi  > 0,
and the qi would be endogenized by a matching function relating the contact rates to aggregate labor
market conditions (see Pissarides, 1990). In this paper we focus on bargaining solutions that are valid
irrespective of the way the aggregate matching rate is determined. Thus, we derive results for given qi.
As we have general cost functions, there is no loss of generality by just fixing qi = 1, i = w, f.
6We could allow for a fixed cost in search, but this would only be relevant in a fully developed matching
model, in which participation decisions of agents are modeled.
7As producing matches are only affected by one type of shock, which is thought to destroy all gains
from trade, this does not lead to any inefficiencies. As such, renegotiation is not a relevant issue in our
model. We return to this in the discussion in Section 6.
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equilibrium, agreement upon a wage w will be reached immediately after the match is
formed, and production will commence, yielding a flow of payoffs w for the worker and
payoffs 7r - w for the firm. The exact bargaining procedure will be discussed in Section 3.
Finally, producing matches dissolve at a rate 0, leaving both agents involved un-
matched. This exogenous breakup of employment relationships is thought to be caused
by shocks that destroy all production potential of the match. Apart from these shocks
we will not allow for any other shocks hitting employment.
3 The bargaining problem
The main argument of the paper can be introduced in a partial analysis, in which we
focus on a single bargaining problem in a single match, taking the market wage ZZ,  i.e.
the expected wage in matches to alternative partners, as given.’ We shortly discuss the
extension to market equilibrium, in which it is explicitly recognized that market wages
should be consistent with decentralized bargaining outcomes, in Section 6. Also note
that, even though we do not explicitly discuss steady state conditions for our matching
model, we restrict attention to stationary aggregate conditions throughout the paper. In
the partial analysis that follows this means that all parameters of the model, including
the market wage, are invariant over time.
Thus, suppose we have a single worker and firm that are just matched and have to
negotiate a wage. We model this negotiation by a modified random offers version of the
alternating offers model by Rubinstein (1982). Suppose that the pair is matched at time
0, and suppose that bargaining proceeds in rounds that cover consecutive time intervals
[An,An+A),n=O,1,2  ,..., for some A > 0. Bargaining is then organized according to
Procedure 1. Bargaining starts with round n = 0, and each round proceeds in 4 steps.
n.0 At time An, nature selects the proposing player: with probability fl  the worker is
selected and with probability 1 - ,L3  the firm, for some 0 < /?  < 1.
n.1  The selected player proposes a wage contract w.
n.2 The responding player chooses either to accept or to reject w. Upon acceptance
bargaining ends and production starts immediately with compensation w. Upon
rejection both partners enter the search state n.3.
n.3 Both players search with given intensities s, and sf for alternative matches, and
face an exogenous hazard of breakdown 7, during the interval (An, An + A). Upon
8Note  that we can safely restrict attention to expected wages because of risk neutrality and the implied
linearity in wages of all value functions.
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meeting another match partner, the agent leaves immediately, and trades with the
new partner against the market wage G, leaving the other agent unmatched. If the
match breaks down exogenously, both agents end up in the unmatched state. If,
during n.3, neither agent has contacted an alternative partner, and if the match has
not broken down exogenously, they enter (n + 1) .O.
Steps n.0,  n.1 and n.2 occur sequentially in a period of length 0.
We assume that both agents perfectly recall all past offers and events. This implicitly
defines the relevant histories and strategies. Note that, in our partial analysis, we do
not allow the agents to leave the bargaining process for the unmatched state voluntarily,
i.e. to take up the immediately available outside option. In Section 6 we argue, however,
that we can allow for such outside options in a market equilibrium analysis without
changing the partial equilibrium results, as outside options cannot be binding in market
equilibrium. Also, n.3 does not allow an agent who has contacted an alternative partner
to choose between the old and the new partner. However, we will argue in Section 6
that leaving for the new partner is optimal in market equilibrium. Finally, note that
we allow the exogenous rate of breakdown r to be different from the rate of breakdown
during production 0‘. This will be useful in explaining the relation with frequently used
axiomatic bargaining solutions.
We close our partial model by specifying the payoffs accruing to the agents when the
bargaining procedure above breaks down, which are the discounted values VT  and VF  of
the unmatched state to workers and firms searching optimally.s  These values depend on
the leisure payoffs, search costs, and the expected capital gain of contacting a job offering
a market wage fi. Let Ww  (w) and Wf  (w) denote the present values of employment at a
wage w. Note that the total value of the match, which we denote by m := Ww(w)+Wf(w),
is independent of w. The values of the unmatched state Vi(s) to agent i searching with
intensity s is implicitly given by the asset equationlO
PxCs> = <i - G(S)  + S(Wi(G) - K(S)), i = w, f.
We anticipate that in market equilibrium cw < w < n - cf, which ensures an internal
solution to the optimal search problems. Because of stationarity, it is easy to solve for
optimal search by unmatched agents. The resulting (optimal) values of unemployment,
gNote  that these are also the payoffs accruing to the agents when their employment relationship is
terminated. However, we will present all results in terms of the present values of employment, and only
exploit some elements of the structure of these value functions, like monotonicity in wages.
‘OAs  bargains are struck without delay in equilibrium, these value functions can be constructed without
distinguishing bargaining as a separate state.
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and therefore the breakdown payoffs, are given by the Bellman equation
PV = msy{Ci - G(S) + s(~~(zz)  - vi*)), (1)
and the corresponding first order condition for the optimal unemployed search intensity,
say st, by
ci(si*)  = W.(zq  - K*,
which simply states that marginal costs and benefits of search should be equal. Note that
the convexity of the search costs ensures uniqueness of this solution.
4 Nash surplus sharing and exogenous search efforts
A partial equilibrium of our search-matching and bargaining model is a SPE of the bar-
gaining model, given optimal search st in unemployment. We first characterize SPE for
given, i.e. exogenous, search efforts si  in the disagreement state. It is well known that
the bargaining game following Procedure 1 has a unique SPE in which a bargain is struck
without delay. Furthermore, for A > 0, the resulting wage w in this SPE depends on the
identity of the agent that is drawn by nature to make the first proposal. Let wi  denote
the SPE wage if agent i is proposing first. Then, the expected division of w in SPE can
be represented by the expected wage, Ew = pww  + (1 - P)wf.
Before characterizing the SPE, it is convenient to introduce the present value of dis-
agreement Di to agent i, which is implicitly given by
pDi(si, qi))  = (7 + q(i,)(v - D&i,  qi)))  + Ci  - c&i)  + si(W@) - D&i,  qi))),
for i = w, f. Here, j : {w, f} + {w, f} adds the opponent to each player, i.e. j(w) = f
and j(f) = w. The flow value pDi  of perpetual disagreement is the sum of the expected
capital gain because of breakdown, the utility of leisure net of search costs, and the
expected capital gain attached to the flow of market opportunities. Consistent with earlier
notation, we write D(s,,  sf) := Dw(sw, s,)  + Df (sf , s,). Note that Di is defined for given
search efforts si  and sjti),  which are not necessarily equal to the optimal efforts of the
unemployed, s5  and ST(~). For future reference, it also useful to note that Di(si, sj(i))  +  &
for r + 00, for all si  and sj(i). Furthermore, Di(si, sjti))  attains a unique maximum
of v at si  = st, for all sj(i)  and parameter values. Thus, ST  maximizes the value of
unemployment to agent i, irrespective of whether agent i is unmatched or bargaining. In
turn, this implies that D(s,,  sf) < w.
The next proposition characterizes the SPE in terms of lEw  and ww - wf  .
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Proposition 1. The bargaining game following Procedure 1 has a unique SPE in which
a bargain is struck without delay, and in which Ew  satisfies
~w(Ew)  = Dw(sw, Sf) + P(tv - D(sw,  sp)). (2)
Furthermore, ww - wf --+  0 for A J 0.
Proof. Similar to Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). For completeness, a sketch of the
proof for our version of the model is provided in the Appendix. III
In general, equation (2) can be interpreted as an axiomatic Nash (1950) bargaining
solution to the division of a (gross) surplus m in which the present values of disagreement
assume the role of the threat points. This general form reduces to more well known Nash
solutions in special cases.
ISS arises if Di  = v, i.e. if si  = sf or r * 00. In this solution, agents are allocated
fixed shares in the quasi-rent. This quasi-rent corresponds to the expected search costs
(including foregone earnings) incurred by both agents, and is the wedge between the
current match and the outside options. The fact that wages depend on the costs of forming
alternative matches motivates the use of the adjective ‘intertemporal’ in ISS. Alternatively,
the agents in a match could split the (gross) instantaneous surplus 7r according to an
axiomatic Nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are given by cw  and cf.
Obviously, both bargaining outcomes have different theoretical and empirical implications,
which explains the efforts that are made in the literature to support the Nash solutions
as equilibria of attractive strategic bargaining games.
ISS is the solution to the wage bargaining problem proposed by Diamond and Maskin
(1979))  Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984, 1985),  and is frequently
applied in the subsequent search and matching literature (see, for examples, Pissarides,
1990, and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). ISS is usually defended as the SPE of a
strategic bargaining game that is driven by the risk of breakdown. In terms of our model,
this line of defense rests on the fact that the expected wage in SPE converges to the wage
that splits the intertemporal surplus if r + 00, given the other parameters. The limiting
game that arises for fixed A is an ultimatum game, in which bargaining breaks down
almost surely after rejection of the first offer. This is the strategic underpinning of ISS
suggested by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). In SPE, the player i selected by nature
to propose in the first bargaining round will propose a wage w that provides a value of
employment W,(,,(w)  to the other player j(i) just equal to his or her breakdown payoff
VAco. Indeed, in expectation ISS results. However, the wages proposed by both players in
the SPE of this limiting game are extreme in the sense that they direct the entire surplus
to the proposing player, and this is true for each A > 0 and does not disappear for A IO.
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This is a highly unattractive feature of the ultimatum game, as it predicts the existence of
two extreme wages in the economy, only corresponding to ISS in expectation. This may
not seem very relevant given risk neutrality of the agents, but it, for instance, creates
strong incentives for search on the job, which is assumed away in most matching models.
An obvious alternative arises if we have r increase without bounds in the limit game of
Proposition 1 (A I 0). This is not an ultimatum game, as there will almost surely be
another proposal after each rejection for all r > 0, and it generates ISS in the limiting
SPE. Furthermore, in this limiting SPE, ISS does not only hold in expectation, but also
independently of the identity of the first mover.
However, the critique that r + 00 drives a large wedge between the bargaining and
production environments remains. It is not clear how we can defend that matches break
down infinitely fast during disagreement, given that shocks destroying the productive
capacity of the match arrive at a 6nite  rate (a < oo)  in any nontrivial version of the
model. The purpose of our analysis is to show that ISS can be supported without relying
on extreme differences between bargaining and producing matches, i.e. for arbitrary
breakdown rates r.
A first step in this direction is made by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985),  who show
that, in a setting similar to ours, ISS can also be supported if agents exert the appropriate
search efforts in the disagreement state. In our terminology, if si  = ST, the expected
capital gains of encountering market opportunities are the same irrespective whether the
unemployed are unmatched or bargaining. Consequently, these gains are internalized in
the disagreement payoffs, and ISS arises.
However, as first shown by Wolinsky (1987),  if agents at some point choose the search
efforts si  during disagreement, they will in general not pick st. In Abbring (1997))  I
discuss an extension of Procedure 1 in which, in each bargaining round n, there is an
additional stage between n.2 and n.3 in which agents simultaneously choose search efforts
for stage n.3. Under the assumption that these search efforts are unobserved, i.e. that
strategies are not allowed to condition on these search efforts, we end up in a model
similar to that of Wolinsky (1987).li
The incentives for search during disagreement are limited, compared to the incentives
for unmatched search. Roughly, unemployed of type i gain the difference between Wi(zT)
and Vi*  and bargaining agents of type i the difference between Wi(W)  and a slightly dis-
counted Wi(lEw).  So, in general agents will exert less search effort while bargaining, and
ISS will not arise. Furthermore, in Section 6 we will argue that in market equilibrium
I1 Wolinsky (1987) considers a model with stochastic matches, i.e. with ex match heterogeneity.
Costain (1996) discusses  endogenizing search intensities in a model similar to that of Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985)) and therefore ours.
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z~  = Ew, so that the only gain of search during disagreement is the avoidance of some dis-
counting by shifting the timing of the payoff Wi(Ew)  = We  slightly closer. Obviously,
this gain disappears as A 4 0, in which case agents will not search during disagreement.
Then, si  = 0, and wages are given by instantaneous surplus sharing.
The reason for this result is that search for market opportunities has no strategic value,
as agents cannot commit to search before disagreement occurs, and search is unobserved.
Costain (1996) mentions a variant in which search is observed, but agents cannot commit
either. As is known from the literature on bargaining with endogenous disagreement
payoffs, such a model typically has a multiplicity of SPE, and is therefore of only limited
value to our purposes (Busch and Wen, 1995). In the next subsection we show that ISS
can be supported as the unique SPE of a bargaining game in which agents can commit
to (observable) search.
5 Bargaining with precommitment to search
Suppose that, before entering the actual bargaining process, agents can precommit to
exerting a certain level of search effort in case of disagreement. This can be formalized as
Procedure 2. When just matched, the worker and firm choose (constant) search inten-
sities s, and sf respectively. Then, they enter node 0.0 of Procedure 1 and are committed
to the selected search intensities.
Commitment of this type, allowing agents to precommit to disagreement actions before
bargaining starts, has a long history in bargaining theory, going back to the seminal work
by Nash (1953) and Schelling  (1960). Note that the agents can precommit to disagreement
actions, but only actually incur the corresponding costs in case of disagreement. We return
to this issue later.
In the precommitment game, each pair of search intensities (So,  sf) selected in the
first stage is followed by a bargaining subgame  similar to the game with exogenous search.
Thus, in any SPE of the precommitment game, the SPE of each bargaining subgame  is
the unique SPE of Proposition 1, for the appropriate values of s,  and sf. This implies
that there is again no delay in SPE, and in any SPE of the precommitment game, s, and
sf should maximize Ww(Ew)  and IV,  (Ew), respectively, with Ew given by (2). We have
the following result.
Proposition 2. The search and bargaining model following Procedure 2 has a unique
SPE in which a bargain is struck without delay. This SPE is characterized by ISS and
search efforts that maximize the value of unemployment, or si  = st,  i = w, f.
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Proof. Let ,& = p and pf = 1 - ,f3.  Then, the first order conditions for optimal search si
a r e
Pj(i) (c:(G) - wi@)  + Di(% Sj(i))) = -Pi (v3’ii) - Dj(i)(Sj(i), Si)) , i = w, f. (3)
First note that (3) is satisfied if s, = st and sf = ST.
Next, the 1.h.s.  of (3) has the sign of si  - sz and the r.h.s. of (3) is nonpositive,
implying that
SW L  s: a n d  sf<s;.
Finally, suppose that si  < ST.  The two conditions (3) can be combined into
(4)
Pf (4&w> - Ww@)  + VW*>  = -Pw (C>(Sf)  - Wf (ZE)  + v;)  )
so that .si < st implies that sjci)  > sTCiJ, which is a contradiction of (4). So, si  = sz and
Di=K*,i=w,f. 17
The intuition for this result is clear. Recall that agent i maximizes Di to equal I$*  by
searching with effort si  = ~5.  So, if agent i precommits  to search with effort si  = ~5,  then
Di  = v, independently of Sj(i).  Then, as agent i is indifferent between disagreement and
being unmatched, agent j(i) cannot affect the bargaining outcome via Di,  and optimizes
the outcome by simply maximizing Dj(i),  which yields Dj(i)  = yTi, and sj(i)  = ST(~).
Obviously this holds for i = w and f alike, so that ISS with si  = sz can be supported as
a SPE of the strategic bargaining game with precommitment.
Also, there are no SPE such that si  > sz  for either i = w or f . To see that this is true,
note that Dj(q  (sj(i),  si)  < Vjyo  for all sj(i)  # Qij,  so that Dj(i>(Sj(i)y  si)  increases with si
for all sj(i)  #  .s;(~). Therefore, given any search effort sj(i)  #  sTCij  of agent j(i), agent i can
increase Di(si, sj(i))  and decrease Dj(i)  (.sj(i),  s;) by reducing si  from a level above ST  to ST.
Finally, note that a search effort Si  < st  is suboptimal from the perspective of the
maximization of Di,  and corresponds to marginal benefits from search (in terms  of Di)
proportional to W(g)  - Di = (W(S) - v)  + (v - Di)  > W(6)  - v. Thus, for si  to be
optimal in the precommitment game, this should be compensated with a sufficiently large
marginal effect on Dj(i):  Vjyi,  - Dj(i)  should be sufficiently large relative to Vi*  - Di.  AS
both s, < s: and sf < s>  are required, this should hold for i = w and f simultaneously.
The proof shows that this is not possible, so that no SPE exist such that s, < s: and
Sf < s;.
This leads to our main conclusion that we can support ISS as the unique SPE of our
bargaining game with precommitment to search. This result is derived independently of
the value of 7,  which is not required to equal CT  or to grow without bounds. As argued in
Section 4, this is an advantage over the alternative line of defense, which draws on having
r +  00.  We conclude by reviewing some issues that deserve additional discussion.
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6 Discussion
So far, we have restricted attention to a partial analysis of the bargaining and search
game played by a single worker and firm, taking market wages as given. The extension
to market equilibrium, in which consistency between market wages and decentralized
bargaining outcomes is required, is standard and does not affect the results on ISS found
so far (see Wolinsky, 1987). Given that agents are infinitely small, market equilibrium is
symmetric, and 27j  = Ew. This fact can be exploited to derive some additional results.
One implication of w = Ew is that the outside option of leaving the bargaining game
for the unmatched state is never binding in market equilibrium. Thus, we can grant the
responding player the additional choice of taking up this outside option without changing
the results (Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1989). Also, because of discounting, agents
will always prefer to take up an encountered market opportunity instead of waiting for
the next bargaining round with the current partner, as both yield the same payoff Ew.
Thus, the restriction that agents are forced to move into an alternative match when it is
contacted has no bite in market equilibrium.
A second issue is the assumption that contracts are not renegotiated. Unlike the Nash
solution, which is static and can be imposed at each point time, the strategic approach
requires a full specification of the timing of the bargaining game and the type of contracts
that are written. In this paper, agents bargain over a contract right after a match has
been formed. As soon as agents have agreed upon a contract, they are committed to trade
against the wage specified in the contract as long as the match continues. As stated before,
this does not lead to inefficiencies, as producing matches are only hit by shocks destroying
all production possibilities. If we maintain the assumption that agents are committed to
trade after the initial contract has been written, we can easily extend our bargaining game
into a renegotiation game as in Macleod and Malcomson (1993, 1995). As commitment
to trade excludes strikes and lockouts, and thus ensures exogenous disagreement payoffs,
the renegotiation game has a unique SPE in which the same initial contract is written and
never renegotiated. In a model in which matches are hit by more types of shocks than
just fatal productivity shocks, like non-fatal productivity shocks or shocks affecting the
outside options of agents, we would still have a unique SPE, in which the contracts are
renegotiated whenever the outside option of either agent is binding. If we could make the
more realistic assumption that contracts only specify wages, and cannot force agents to
trade, our renegotiation game would be a bargaining game with endogenous disagreement
payoffs. Such a model is known to have multiple SPE, which makes this approach less
suitable for the purpose of this paper (Macleod and Malcomson, 1995).12
12More  in general, the multiplicity of SPE in sequential bargaining games with endogenous disagreement
payoffs is well known. See Haller and Holden  (1990))  Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Busch and Wen
12
We conclude by shortly discussing the commitment assumption. In our model, agents
can precommit  to search without incurring any of the corresponding costs. Although this
is fairly standard, one may prefer a slightly subtler version of the model, in which agents
can only commit to search one bargaining period ahead, and have to incur the corre-
sponding expected search cost even if agreement is reached before search occurs. More
precisely, instead of allowing agents to choose search intensities for the entire bargaining
game before node 0.0, as in Procedure 2, we could allow agents to choose search intensities
for state n.3 between (n - 1).3  and n.0 in each period n. We could then require agents
to pay for the expected search costs even if stage n.3 is never reached, but in any equilib-
rium without nontrivial delay this would be irrelevant to the analysis in the limit A 1 0.
The model set up in this manner is closer to a version of the model by Wolinsky (1987)
with commitment to observable search than the model in this paper. Thus, it would be
interesting to characterize the set of SPE in such a model, and compare these to the set
of SPE in a model with observable search efforts without commitment.i3  However, as this
is a nontrivial extension of the model that would draw attention away from the simple
point made in Proposition 2, we leave this for future research.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 (sketch)
Let (Y := r + s,  + sf + p. In any SPE, the worker and firm proposals w”  and wf should satisfy
J/q,m>  =
l- zaA 0
7 + sj(q]VF + siWi(73)  + Ci  - ci(si)}  + e-“AWi(TEw), (5)
for i = w, f.  The arguments provided by Shaked and Sutton (1984) can be used to prove uniqueness of
the SPE. Next, note that the two SPE conditions in (5) imply that
ngwf)  - WW(W”)  = I- ;- aA{-aw+ c [r+sj(i)]~*+s;W,(~)+C,-cio},
i=uJ,f
and therefore limAJo  w” - wf = 0. Finally, the SPE conditions in (5) can be combined into (2).
(1995). A more extensive discussion on assumptions on contracting and bargaining issues in a matching
model can be found in Abbring (1997).
13Note  that Wolinsky (1987) avoids all problems by assuming that search in unobservable.
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